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C) 
COpy 
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
JESSEE MAHONE, LLC, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) 
PAUL E. VIERA, JR., individually and as ) 
Managing Member of Earnest Holdings, ) 
LLC, and EARNEST HOLDINGS, LLC, ) 
) 
Defendants, ) 
Civil Action File No. 
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS 
On October 18, 2007, the parties in the above-styled case appeared before the Court to 
argue Defendants' Motions to Dismiss. After reviewing the record of the case, the briefs 
submitted in support of the motions, and the arguments presented by counsel, the Court finds as 
follows: 
FACTS: 
Defendant Paul Viera, Jr. is the majority member and Managing Member of Earnest 
Holdings, LLC ("Earnest Holdings"), a Delaware limited liability company and Defendant in this 
action. Plaintiff Jessee Mahone, LLC ("Mahone"), is a minority member in Earnest Holdings, 
and is wholly owned by Wendell Starke. 
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants denied him access to Earnest Holdings' books and 
records, and that Defendant Viera amended the Operating Agreement in a manner that violated 
its original tenns, wrongfully diluted Mahone's ownership interest in Earnest Holdings, and 
breached his fiduciary duties owed to Mahone. 
Plaintiff filed an eight-count complaint on August 17, 2007, seeking a declaratory 
judgment, specific perfonnance, and the appointment of a receiver, as well as asserting claims 
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(J for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duties, unjust enrichment and the expenses of 
litigation. Defendants filed individual motions to dismiss on September 17, 2007. 
STANDARD: 
A party seeking a motion to dismiss brought under O.CG.A. § 9-11-12(b)(6) for failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted must demonstrate that Plaintiffs allegations in 
the complaint disclose with certainty that the claimant would not be entitled to relief under any 
state of provable facts asserted in support thereof. Common Cause/Georgia v. City of 
Atlanta, 279 Ga. 480, 481 (2005). The internal affairs of a corporation, such as actions involving 
officers and directors, shall be regulated by the law of the state of incorporation. Diedrich v. 
Miller & Meier & Assoc., Architects & Planners, Inc., 254 Ga. 734, 735 (1985). 
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION: 
Defendants Viera and Earnest Holdings assert that all counts of Plaintiffs complaint 
which seek, among other remedies, access to the books and records of Earnest Holdings, should 
be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to § 18-305 of the Delaware Limited 
Liability Company Act. Section 18-305 describes a limited liability company member's right 
to access company books and records and requires that such action be brought in the Court of 
Chancery. 6 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 18-305, 305(f) (2007) ("Any action to enforce any right 
arising under this section shall be brought in the Court of Chancery."). "The Court of Chancery 
is hereby vested with exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether or not the person seeking such 
infonnation is entitled to the information sought." Id. (emphasis added). Defendants assert that 
Section 18-305 grants the Delaware Court of Chancery exclusive jurisdiction over any count 
requesting access to the books, thus denying this Court subject matter jurisdiction to hear such 
claims. 
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o Whether or not a Georgia court has subject matter jU1isdiction to hear an access to the 
books and records claim of a Delaware corporation brought under Section 18-305 is a question 
of first impression in this state. Defendants direct the Court to a 2000 Florida Court of Appeals 
opinion where that Court dismissed a trial court's order granting access to the books under 
Section 18-305 ofa Delaware limited liability company with its principal place of business in 
Florida. Synchron, Inc., v. Ilya Kogan, Conso!., 757 So. 2d 564 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000). 
In the Synchron case, the only issue before the Florida court was access. Additionally, 
the defendant company was not registered to do business in Florida, and it did not receive service 
of notice ofthe September 10th hearing until September 17th . Thus, based upon the service 
question, the Florida Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order requiring access to the 
books for lack of personal jurisdiction. In dicta, the Court stated that "[Delaware 1 law does not 
(J purport to confer any authority on Florida's courts". Id. at 565. The Court further explained, in a 
footnote, that if "the Delaware statute were the only possible basis upon which Kogan could seek 
relief, the September I 0 order would be void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction ... " Id. at n.l 
(emphasis added). Thus, this case is inapposite on the question before this Court because service 
was perfected on all parties prior to the hearing and because there are questions ofIaw, such as 
breach of contract, arising under Georgia law. 
Plaintiff, on the other hand, urges this Court to hold, as did a New York Court, that the 
Delaware code does not divest it of jurisdiction to hear the access issues in this case. In Sachs v. 
Adeli, 804 N.Y.S.2d 731, 733 (N.Y. App.Div. 2005), the New York Court held that 
incorporation in Delaware did not divest New York "of its interest in adjudicating this matter," 
thus the Court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the access question. Id. ("If an action 
() concerns a commercial transaction in New York, and it is a matter on which New York Courts 
would otherwise have proper jurisdiction, comity does not prevent the New York courts from 
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(J exercising that jUlisdiction."); see also, Havlicek v. Coast-to-Coast Analvtical Servs., 39 Cal. 
App. 4th 1844 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (reversing a ttial court dismissal for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction of an action to inspect the books of a Delaware corporation doing business in 
California and applying Califomia law). In 2006, however, a Federal District Court in New 
York held that the Delaware Corporate Code, which was the source of the right to inspect the 
books and records claim in the case, granted exclusive jurisdiction to the Delaware Court of 
Chancery, thus depriving the New York Court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over 
the claim. Reserve Solutions Inc., v. Vernaglia, 438 F.Supp. 2d 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). Sachs v. 
Adeli, therefore, in light of the 2006 opinion in Reserve Solutions, provides little instruction in 
the matter presently before this court. 
Plaintiff also directs the Court to Section 13.13 the Earnest Holdings Operating 
o Agreement which states that "[a]ll parties hereto consent to personal jurisdiction and venue in the 
county where the principal office ofthe Company is located, and any action in law or in equity 
I:J 
shall be brought in any court having competent jurisdiction located in such county." 
Additionally, Plaintiff relies upon Section 13.22 which states, "[i]f any particular provision 
herein is construed to be in conflict with the provisions of the Act, the provisions of this 
Agreement shall control to the fullest extent pennitted by applicable law." Plaintiff argues that 
freedom of contract, as supported in the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, pennits the 
parties to agree to bring claims, including those involving access, in whatever jurisdiction they 
choose. See e.g., Senior Tour Players 207 Mgmt. Co. LLC v. Golftown 207 Holding Co., LLC, 
853 A.2d 124, 127 (Del. Ch. 2004) ("[S]ection 18-110 I ofthe LLCA states that it is 'the policy 
of [the LLCA] to give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the 
enforceability oflimited liability company agreements. "'). Defendants, however, counter that 
subject matter jurisdiction is not conferrable upon a court by mere agreement of the parties. 
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Because the Court is presented with a question of first impression with little guidance 
from other jurisdictions or applicable law, it must engage in its own analysis of its subject matter 
jurisdiction over an access claim brought under Delaware Section 18-305. This Section 
governing a limited liability company member's right of inspection states that "[a]ny action to 
enforce any right arising under this section shall be brought in the Court of Chancery." DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 18-305 (2007). O.C.G.A. § 14-11-313, the parallel Georgia statue on 
inspection rights, reads "ifthe limited liability company refuses to permit the inspection 
authorized by paragraph (2) of this Code section, the member demanding inspection may apply 
to the superior court for the county in which the registered office of the limited liability company 
is located ... " (emphasis added). Under the Georgia court system, the superior court, like the 
Chancery Court, has exclusive equity jurisdiction. 
Subject matter jurisdiction is defined as "[j]urisdiction over the nature of the case and the 
type of relief sought; the extent to which a court can rule on the conduct of persons or the status 
of things." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 856 (7th ed. 1999). A review of Delaware's statutes 
governing business organizations, reveals that Delaware's Chancery Court is only granted 
"exclusive jurisdiction" in statutes addressing inspection of books and records in various 
business organizations. In reading the Delaware statute at issue, the critical element seems to be 
equity jurisdiction to order specific performance, which is the appropriate remedy for a breach of 
inspection rights. The grant of exclusive jurisdiction seems to be to an equity court, not to the 
Delaware Chancery Court versus another court in equity. 
The only argument for why a Delaware Chancery Court would be better suited to hear the 
inspection issue over other equity courts would be location of the books. The argument would 
be that a Delaware limited liability company would likely have its books stored in Delaware and 
thus the Delaware Chancery Court would be best suited to not only appraise the rights in 
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C) question, but also to enforce access to those books located within its geographic jurisdiction. An 
analogy could be drawn to in rem or CJlIasi- in-rem jurisdiction where the location ofthe propeliy 
in question detennines the jurisdiction of the court. See generally, Brown v. Rock, 184 Ga. App. 
699,700 (1987) ("Where ... the action is in rem or CJlIasi-in-rem. 'a judgment ... is limited to the 
property that supports jurisdiction "'). 
() 
As stated above, the Fulton County Superior Court is vested with equity jurisdiction, and 
has jurisdiction over inspection claims brought under Georgia's limited liability company code. 
Additionally, in this action, Defendant Earnest Holdings is incorporated in Delaware, but 
Georgia houses its principal place of business and its books. In addition, this action raises claims 
properly brought under Georgia law (i.e., breach of contract) and is not exclusively a contest of 
inspection rights. 
Finally, the parties in this action contracted for Georgia, as Earnest Holdings' principal 
place of business, to be the forum in which claims arising under the Operating Agreement (e.g. 
inspection rights) are brought. The parties also stated that when the tenn of the Operating 
Agreement and the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act conflict, the Operating Agreement 
governs. Giving full import to the contractual provisions ofthe Operating Agreement and the 
principle of freedom of contract, as required under Delaware law, Georgia appears to be the 
appropriate forum in which to bring this action, including Plaintiffs inspection claims. 
While this Court agrees with the general argument upon which Defendants rely that 
parties cannot contract to give an otherwise unqualified court subject matter jurisdiction, that 
argument does not necessarily apply to the facts of this case. The Fulton County Superior Court 
is an equity jurisdiction court vested with the authority to hear claims such as declaratory 
judgment and specific perfonnance relating to inspection rights. The question is not whether the 
Fulton County Superior Court has jurisdiction to hear inspection claims; the question is whether 
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o the Delaware Legislature acting through Section 18-305(f) of the Delaware Limited Liability 
Company Act can strip an otherwise competent court in another state of its jurisdiction to hear 
such claims. The Court answers that question in the negative. That action is the province and 
right offederallaw alone. 
Therefore, the Court finds that an equity court of this state has jurisdiction to hear claims 
brought under Delaware Section 18-305 where (1) there are other claims arising under the law of 
this state, (2) the books of the company are located in this state, and/or (3) the parties have 
contracted to bring such claims in this state. Defendants' Motions to Dismiss for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction are hereby DENIED. 
DIRECT VS. DERIVATIVE CLAIMS: 
Defendant Earnest Holdings requests that the Court dismiss Plaintiffs counts against it 
C) on the basis that Plaintiff brings derivative claims without having first satisfied the pre-suit 
demand requirement. See, Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., 500 U.S. 90, 96-97 (1991). To 
o 
determine whether a claim is direct or derivative in nature, the proper inquiry asks (1) who 
suffered the alleged hann and (2) who would receive the benefit of any recovery. Tooley v. 
Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1033 (Del. 2004). 
Plaintiffs complaint alleges that Mahone, as a minority member of Earnest Holdings, 
was denied access to the books, was denied notice of an opportunity to vote on Operating 
Agreement Amendments, and had its ownership interest wrongfully diluted. In each of these 
alleged actions, Plaintiff Mahone suffered the harm and would receive the benefit of recovery, 
not Earnest Holdings. Plaintiff brings direct claims and therefore is outside ofthe demand 
requirement in derivative suits. 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Earnest Holdings' Motion to Dismiss is hereby 
DENIED. 
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'~ FORUM NON CONVENIENS: 
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(J 
Because Defendants' request to dismiss have been denied as stated above, Defendant 
Viera's request to dismiss under the theory of forum non conveniens, pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-
10-31.1, is without justification. Therefore, Defendant Viera's motion to dismiss for forum non 
conveniens is hereby DENIED. 
\J. ~ SO ORDERED this ( day of, 2007. 
Copies to: 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Erika C. Birg, Esq. 
Shuman Sohrn, Esq. 
SEYFARTH SHAW LLP 
1545 Peachtree Street., NE, Suite 700 
Atlanta, GA 30309 
(404) 885-1500 
(404) 892-7056 
for 
ELIZA ETH E. L GE 
ALICE D. BONNER, SENIOR JUDGE 
Superior Court of Fulton County 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
Attorneys for Defendants 
John J. Dalton, Esq. 
Kaye Woodard Burwell, Esq. 
TROUTMAN SANDERS LLP 
5200 Bank of America Plaza 
600 Peachtree Street, N.E. 
Atlanta, GA 30308-2216 
(404) 885-3442 
(/llloJ11ryJor..J Pall! E. Vie"',}I:) 
Thomas G. Sampson, Esq. 
Jeffrey E. Tompkins, Esq. 
Shukura L. Ingram, Esq. 
THOMAS KENNEDY SAMPSON & PATTERSON 
LLP 
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(404) 688-4503 
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